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Abstract
How do changes in market structure a⁄ect the US business cycle? We estimate a
monetary DSGE model with endogenous ￿rm/product entry and a translog expenditure
function by Bayesian methods. The dynamics of net business formation allow us to
identify the ￿competition e⁄ect￿, by which desired price markups and in￿ation decrease
when entry rises. We ￿nd that a 1 percent increase in the number of competitors
lowers desired markups by 0.18 percent. Most of the cyclical variability in in￿ation is
driven by markup ￿uctuations due to sticky prices or exogenous shocks rather than
endogenous changes in desired markups.
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1Monetary business cycle models typically feature monopolistic competition; this is to justify
price setting power and sticky prices. At the same time, such models tend to depart from
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) by assuming a ￿xed range of products and ￿rms, an assumption
which in the presence of positive pro￿ts is di¢cult to uphold. In response to this, a largely
theoretical literature has emerged that investigates the role of ￿rm and product entry for
aggregate ￿uctuations. In particular, the ￿competition e⁄ect￿, by which an increase in the
number of competitors reduces desired markups and in￿ation, acts as an endogenous prop-
agation and ampli￿cation mechanism. Floetotto and Jaimovich (2008) present a business
cycle model with oligopolistic competition, where ￿rm entry has a negative e⁄ect on markups.
Colciago and Etro (2010) show that such a model outperforms the standard real business
cycle (RBC) model in terms of matching second moments of certain variables in the data.
Bilbiie, Ghironi and Melitz (2011) show that an RBC model with translog consumption pref-
erences generates a competition e⁄ect and countercyclical markups. Under this preference
structure, the price-elasticity of demand is increasing in the number of available products.
This paper provides an empirical model validation exercise which is so far missing in the
literature. It uses Bayesian techniques to estimate the competition e⁄ect in a dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with endogenous entry. We seek to answer
two questions. First, how does the competition e⁄ect in￿uence the cyclical behavior of
markups? Second, is this e⁄ect important in explaining US in￿ation ￿uctuations?
Our ￿rst question relates to the dynamics of price-cost markups, which are key in business
cycle transmission. Consider the standard New Keynesian model. On the one hand, an
expansionary demand shock raises marginal costs. If prices do not adjust fully, markups
fall. On the other hand, an expansionary supply shock lowers marginal costs. If prices
do not adjust fully, markups rise. When entry and exit dynamics are taken into account,
markups may additionally depend on the degree of competition, i.e. on the number of ￿rms
or products.1 The response of entry to a shock determines how the competition e⁄ect works.
If an expansionary shock (i.e. one that raises output) leads to pro￿t opportunities over
and above entry costs, new ￿rms and products enter. Then desired markups and in￿ation
1Campbell and Hopenhayn (2005) present empirical evidence that markups are negatively related to the
number of competitors in an industry.
2are reduced through the competition e⁄ect. In contrast, if an expansionary shock crowds
out entry, desired markups and in￿ation rise through the competition e⁄ect. Therefore,
the competition e⁄ect may amplify or dampen propagation in the New Keynesian model.
This paper characterizes the conditional dynamics of entry (or the ￿extensive margin￿) and
markups in response to an array of shocks.
Markups of prices over marginal cost are unobserved and therefore hard to measure. There is
no agreement on the conditional properties of markups in the data, or even on their uncondi-
tional cyclicality. The in￿uential work by Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) ￿nds evidence of
countercyclical markups, while the more recent contribution by Nekarda and Ramey (2010)
presents evidence supporting procyclical markups. We circumvent the measurement problem
by excluding markups from the estimation and focussing instead on directly observable vari-
ables. Using our parameter estimates, we then describe the cyclical behavior of the markup
implied by the model. In addition, we quantify the contribution of the competition e⁄ect
and desired markup shocks to the markup-output correlation.
Our second question concerns the contribution of entry and the competition e⁄ect to move-
ments in in￿ation. The answer to this question has implications for monetary policy. Optimal
monetary policy aims at eliminating ine¢ciencies arising from price setting distortions; i.e.
it tries to replicate the equilibrium allocations that would arise under perfect price ￿exibility.
If the competition e⁄ect accounts for a large fraction of in￿ation variability, the central bank
runs the risk of reacting to changes in in￿ation that do not re￿ect price rigidities but instead
endogenous changes in market structure. In order to assess this risk, we wish to quantify
the relevance of the competition e⁄ect for US in￿ation.
Firm and product turnover has been neglected in empirical business cycle research, e.g. in
the in￿uential studies by Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) and Smets and Wouters
(2007). Two exceptions are worth noting, however. Cecioni (2010) estimates a New Key-
nesian Phillips Curve augmented with ￿rm entry. She ￿nds that the pass-through of real
marginal costs to in￿ation becomes stronger when entry and the competition e⁄ect are taken
into account. Lewis and Poilly (2012) estimate two variants of the endogenous-entry model
by minimizing the distance between the model-based impulse responses to a monetary policy
shock and their empirical counterparts. The ￿rst model variant features translog preferences
3and a demand-driven competition e⁄ect, while the second assumes strategic interactions be-
tween oligopolists and a supply-driven competition e⁄ect. They ￿nd that the ￿rst model
generates a signi￿cant competition e⁄ect in the monetary transmission mechanism, while
the second model does not. This paper estimates a DSGE model with endogenous entry
using Bayesian methods as in Smets and Wouters (2007). The model features sunk-cost
driven entry dynamics and a translog expenditure function for intermediate goods, as well
as a host of nominal and real frictions. Assuming a range of exogenous shocks and using a
Bayesian approach allows us to address the two research questions posed above, which is not
possible in the limited information estimation exercise in Lewis and Poilly (2012) or with
the single-equation method of Cecioni (2010).
Our contribution is twofold. First, we show that the way the competition e⁄ect in￿uences
business cycle transmission is shock-dependent. Supply shocks and monetary policy shocks
entail a procyclical movement of entry, thereby inducing a countercyclical desired markup
response. Demand shocks, in contrast, lead to a countercyclical response of entry and pro-
cyclical desired markups.2 The model-implied markup is countercyclical once the competi-
tion e⁄ect and shocks to desired markups are taken into account. Second, we carry out a
counterfactual analysis of US in￿ation, showing that the historical in￿ation path was not
strongly altered by the competition e⁄ect. Empirically, therefore, the competition e⁄ect of
entry does not pose a great risk of monetary policy mistakenly reacting to e¢cient markup
￿uctuations.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 1, we present an outline of the baseline model.
Section 2 contains details on the estimation method, the data, our choice of priors, and
posterior distribution statistics. In Section 3, we characterize the transmission channels of
various shocks through the competition e⁄ect and the overall cyclicality of the model-implied
markup. We perform a counterfactual decomposition of US in￿ation in Section 4. Section 5
discusses a number of robustness exercises. Section 6 concludes.
2Our analysis of transmission channels extends Bilbiie, Ghironi and Melitz (2007) and Bilbiie, Ghironi
and Melitz (2011), who consider fewer shocks and a smaller set of frictions.
41 Model
Our model combines the entry mechanism and the translog expenditure function proposed
by Bilbiie, Ghironi and Melitz (2011) with a set of real and nominal frictions as in Chris-
tiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2007). In the ￿rst subsection,
we derive in detail the part of the model related to the translog expenditure function, de-
sired markups and the competition e⁄ect. The remaining model equations are presented
in linearized form.3 Hatted variables denote deviations from the deterministic steady state.
Variables without a hat or time subscript refer to the steady state level. The equilibrium we
consider is symmetric: all households, ￿rms and entrants are identical.
1.1 Translog Expenditure Function, Desired Markups and Com-
petition E⁄ect
We assume that aggregation over intermediate goods varieties takes the translog form, such
that the elasticity of demand for an individual good is increasing in the number of competing
goods. Consumers choose the cost-minimizing combination of goods to obtain one unit of
  C
t , the aggregate goods bundle, at price  t, the aggregate (welfare-based) price index. As
in Feenstra (2003), we postulate that the optimal expenditure function is given by
ln t =
1
2
~   ￿  t
Dt ~   t
+
1
 t
Nt X
f=1
ln 
f
t +
Dt
2
Nt X
f=1
Nt X
j=1
 fj ln 
f
t ln 
j
t, (1)
where     = 1      t and
￿
 fj = ￿Nt￿1
Nt , for   =  
 fj = 1
Nt, for   6=   .
 t is the (time-varying) number of available goods and ~      t is the (constant) number
of all conceivable goods.4 The interpretation of Dt will become clear below. By Shephard￿s
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3For a full model derivation, see the appendix available at http://sites.google.com/site/vivienjlewis.
4We use the terms ￿goods￿ and ￿￿rms￿ interchangeably throughout, assuming that each ￿rm produces
exactly one di⁄erentiated variety. For expositional purposes, we treat  t as a natural number in this
subsection. In the remainder of the model outline,  t 2 R+.
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We impose Dt   0 to ensure that the demand elasticity exceeds unity.
Under symmetry ( 
f
t =  
j
t =  t), the price index (1) simpli￿es to
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De￿ning the real product price  t as the ratio of the nominal product price  t to the aggregate
price index  t, i.e.  t ￿  t  t, we have
 t ( t) = exp
 
￿
1
2
~   ￿  t
Dt ~   t
!
.
The real product price is a positive function of the number of ￿rms and products,  t. In
linearized form, this is5
^  t =   ^  t, where   =
1
2D 
.
5The linearized real product price contains an additional term,
~ N￿N
~ N  ^ Dt. We set this term to zero,
assuming a negligible number of conceivable goods that are not produced, ~   ￿   ’ 0.
6The elasticity of the real product price to the number of ￿rms/products is   ￿ 0. This
parameter captures ￿love of variety￿, which measures the degree to which consumers can
increase their utility by spreading their consumption expenditure across more di⁄erentiated
goods. Under the translog expenditure function assumed above, love of variety is inversely
related to the steady state number of ￿rms   and to the price-elasticity of the spending
share in steady state, D.6 Under price symmetry (ln t = ln 
f
t), the expenditure share (2)
equals the inverse of the number of goods,
 t ( t) =
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The demand for a single variety is then found by rearranging the de￿nition of the expenditure
share  t =
￿tyt
Y C
t and substituting out  t using (4),  t =
Y C
t
￿tNt. In linearized form, this is
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Furthermore, using (4) in (3), the demand elasticity simpli￿es to
 t ( t) = 1 + Dt t. (5)
Intuitively, more product diversity makes demand more elastic, as products become more
substitutable with entry. With a time-varying demand elasticity, the desired markup de￿ned
as  d
t ( t) ￿
"t(Nt)
"t(Nt)￿1 is also time-varying. In particular,
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In linearized form, the desired markup is
^  
d
t = ￿ (^ Dt + ^  t), where   =
1
1 + D 
. (6)
The desired markup (6) has an endogenous component (￿  ^  t) and an exogenous component
(￿ ^ Dt). The elasticity of the desired markup to the number of ￿rms captures the ￿competition
e⁄ect￿. For     0, desired markups are eroded by the arrival of new entrants. Assuming a
translog expenditure function, the competition e⁄ect equals the inverse steady state demand
elasticity,   = 1
".
6In Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) preferences, love of variety is   = 1
"￿1, where   denotes both the substitution
elasticity between goods as well as the price-elasticity of demand. Floetotto and Jaimovich (2008) assume
zero love of variety (  = 0), such that no utility gain arises from additional product diversity.
71.2 Firms
We consider a two-sector economy where capital and labor are employed to produce goods
and new ￿rms. Let the subscript   denote the goods-producing (manufacturing) sector and
let subscript   denote the entry sector. The aggregate production function for goods states
that output is produced under a Cobb-Douglas technology with capital services ^  s
C;t and
labor ^  C;t, weighted by BC and 1 ￿ BC, respectively, where BC 2 (0 1). Total goods output
of all ￿rms is the sum of ￿rm output ^  t and the stock of ￿rms ^  t,
^  t + ^  t = BC ^  
s
C;t + (1 ￿ BC) ^  C;t + ^  
Z
t .
The variable ^  
Z
t denotes exogenous total factor productivity (TFP). New ￿rms ^  E;t are
produced with an analogous technology,
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E
t = BE ^  
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E;t + (1 ￿ BE) ^  E;t + ^  
Z
t . (7)
The exogenous variable ^  
E
t captures entry costs per ￿rm, measured in terms of a composite
of labor and capital services. The production structure is symmetric such that the capital
share is the same in the two sectors, BC = BE = B.7 Marginal costs c   t for producing goods
as well as ￿rms are a weighted average of the rental rate of capital ^  k
t and the real wage ^  t,
less TFP,
c   t = B^  
k
t + (1 ￿ B) ^  t ￿ ^  
Z
t .
Cost minimization by ￿rms implies that the rental bill and the wage bill are proportional to
each other,
^  
k
t + ^  
s
C;t = ^  t + ^  C;t.
Perfect factor mobility equates the capital-labor ratio across the two sectors,
^  
s
C;t ￿ ^  C;t = ^  
s
E;t ￿ ^  E;t.
Firm-level pro￿ts are denoted  t, while aggregate pro￿ts are given by
^  t + ^  t = (  ￿ 1) ^  t + ^  
C
t , (8)
7In an additional exercise, we set BC = B and BE = 0. See the sensitivity analysis in Section 5.
8where   = 1+D  is the steady state price-elasticity of demand, see (5). Monopolistic ￿rms
set prices as a markup ^  t over marginal costs,
^  t = ^  t + ^   t.
Price setters are subject to a quadratic price adjustment cost of the Rotemberg (1982)-type.
Non-adjusted prices are indexed to lagged in￿ation. The New Keynesian Phillips Curve
(NKPC) relates the change in product prices ^  p;t to its lagged and expected future value,
and to the di⁄erence between the desired and the actual markup,
^  p;t ￿  p^  p;t￿1 =
  ￿ 1
 p
(^  
d
t ￿ ^  t) + C (1 ￿ EN) tf^  p;t+1 ￿  p^  p;tg, (9)
where  p   0 is the degree of price stickiness,  p 2 (0 1) is the rate of indexation, C 2 (0 1)
is the representative agent￿s subjective discount factor and  t denotes the expectations
operator conditional on the information set at the beginning of period  . We substitute the
desired markup (6) in (9) to obtain an alternative formulation of the NKPC,
^  p;t ￿  p^  p;t￿1 =
  ￿ 1
 p
(￿  ^  t ￿ ^  t) + C (1 ￿ EN) tf^  p;t+1 ￿  p^  p;tg + ^  
P
t , (10)
where ^  
P
t , often referred to as a ￿cost-push shock￿, is a transformation of the price-elasticity
of the spending share,
^  
P
t = ￿
  ￿ 1
 p
 ^ Dt, (11)
and thus represents an exogenous shock to desired price markups, see (6). We multiply the
exogenous component of the desired markup in (6) by "￿1
￿p in order to have the desired markup
shock enter the NKPC with a unit coe¢cient. Through the competition e⁄ect (    0), an
increase in the number of ￿rms and goods has a direct negative e⁄ect on in￿ation.
1.3 Households
Households derive utility from consuming ^  t and disutility from working ^  t. The respective
marginal utilities are given by
^  C;t = ￿
 C
1 ￿  
( ^  t ￿   ^  t￿1) and ^  L;t =  L^  t,
where  C   0 is the degree of risk aversion,   2 (0 1) captures external habit formation
in consumption and  L   0 is the inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply with respect to
9the real wage. The household has access to a risk-free one-period nominal bond that pays
interest ^  t; the optimal choice of bonds leads to the Euler equation
^  C;t =  tf( ^  t ￿ ^  
C
p;t+1) + ^  C;t+1g + ^  
T
t , (12)
where ^  
C
p;t is the change in the welfare-based price index  t. The ￿time preference￿ shock ^  
T
t
is derived from a disturbance to the subjective discount factor C. Capital services are the
sum of the capital stock ^  t and its utilization ^  t,
^  
s
t = ^  t + ^  t.
The optimal choice of capital utilization results in a utilization rate that is adjusted to the
rental rate of capital with elasticity  a,
^  t =  a^  
k
t,
where  a = 1￿e ￿a
e ￿a and ~  a 2 (0 1) measures utilization adjustment costs. Accumulation of
physical capital takes the form
^  t+1 = (1 ￿ EK) ^  t + EK ^  t + EK (1 + C) K^  
I
t,
where ^  t is intensive margin investment, i.e. investment in physical capital, and EK 2 (0 1)
is the capital depreciation rate. The term ^  
I
t represents an exogenous shock to investment-
speci￿c technology. The optimal choice of physical capital gives rise to a  -equation,
^  t =  tf￿( ^  t ￿ ^  
C
p;t+1) + [1 ￿ C (1 ￿ EK)] ^  
k
t+1 + C (1 ￿ EK) ^  t+1g, (13)
where the real value of capital ^  t depends positively on its expected future value and on the
expected future rental rate, and negatively on the real interest rate. Physical investment
is subject to ￿ow adjustment costs of the type introduced in Christiano, Eichenbaum and
Evans (2005). As a result, current investment is a function of its lagged and expected future
value, as well as the current value of capital,
^  t =
1
(1 + C) K
^  t +
C
1 + C
 tf^  t+1g +
1
1 + C
^  t￿1 + ^  
I
t,
10where  K captures investment adjustment costs at the intensive margin. Extensive margin
investment is determined analogously. The number of ￿rms and goods evolves according to
the following law of motion,
^  t+1 = (1 ￿ EN) ^  t + EN ^  E;t, (14)
where EN is the ￿rm exit rate. The value of a ￿rm ^  t depends positively on its expected
future value, on expected future dividends, and negatively on the real interest rate,
^  t =  tf￿( ^  t ￿ ^  
C
p;t+1) + [1 ￿ C (1 ￿ EN)] ^  t+1 + C (1 ￿ EN) ^  t+1g. (15)
The number of entrants depends on its lagged and expected future value, and on the di⁄erence
between ￿rm value and the entry cost c   t + ^  
E
t ,
^  E;t =
1
(1 + C) N
[^  t ￿ (c   t + ^  
E
t )] +
C
1 + C
 tf ^  E;t+1g +
1
1 + C
^  E;t￿1, (16)
where  N captures investment adjustment costs at the extensive margin.8 Total investment
is the sum of intensive and extensive margin investment,
c   t =
 
  
^  t +
  E
  
(c   t + ^  E;t + ^  
E
t ).
We assume monopolistic wage setters and sticky wages as in Erceg, Henderson and Levin
(2000). In addition, we stipulate that non-adjusted wages are indexed to price in￿ation with
coe¢cient  w. Wage in￿ation ^  w;t is thus determined as follows,
^  w;t ￿  w^  p;t￿1 =
 w ￿ 1
 w
[(^  L;t ￿ ^  C;t) ￿ ^  t] + C t f^  w;t+1 ￿  w^  p;tg + ^  
W
t ,
where  w   0 is the degree of wage stickiness,  w   1 is the elasticity of substitution between
labor types, and ^  
W
t denotes an exogenous shock to wage in￿ation.
1.4 Market Clearing
The aggregate goods bundle ^   C
t is a weighted average of private consumption ^  t, physical
capital investment ^  t, the costs of adjusting the utilization rate ^  t and exogenous government
consumption ^  
G
t ,
^  
C
t =
 
  C
^  t +
 
  C
^  t +
 k 
  C ^  t + ^  
G
t .
8For a more detailed derivation of the dynamic entry equation (16), see Lewis and Poilly (2012).
11Let ^  t denote total expenditure, which equals goods output and investment at the extensive
margin,
^  t =
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The market clearing conditions for labor and capital services are, respectively,
^  t =
 C
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^  E;t, and ^  
s
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s
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 E
 
^  
s
E;t.
1.5 Monetary Policy
Monetary policy follows a Taylor-type rule with interest rate smoothing. The interest rate
is adjusted in response to the level and the growth rate of the output gap, to product price
in￿ation and to the lagged interest rate,
^  t =  R ^  t￿1 + (1 ￿  R)( ￿^  p;t +  Y ^  
gap
t ) +  dy￿^  
gap
t + ^  
R
t (17)
where ￿ is the ￿rst di⁄erence operator and ^  
gap
t is the output gap de￿ned as actual output
^  t less the natural output level that would prevail under perfectly ￿exible prices and wages,
^   n
t . The term ^  
R
t represents an exogenous monetary policy shock.
1.6 Exogenous Shock Processes
Table 1 summarizes the functional forms assumed for the eight exogenous shocks.
[ insert Table 1 here ]
Except for the government spending and markup shocks, all disturbances follow   (1)
processes in logarithmic terms. Following Smets and Wouters (2007), government spending
is also a⁄ected by the innovation in the TFP-process and disturbances to price and wage
markups follow     (1 1) processes.
2 Estimation
We apply Bayesian estimation techniques as in Fernandez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramirez
(2004) and Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007). For a detailed description, we refer to the
original papers. In a nutshell, using the Bayesian paradigm prior information is combined
12with the data to obtain posterior distributions for the parameters.9 In the following, we
describe the data sources and transformations, before turning to our choice of priors and to
the posterior distributions of the model parameters.
2.1 Data
In the model, real variables are de￿ated by the welfare-based price index  t, which is un-
observed. Empirical measures of the price index correspond rather to the product price  t,
given that consumption baskets are not updated frequently enough to fully take into account
the welfare e⁄ects from product turnover. To link the model with the data, we strip out the
variety e⁄ect on the price index by multiplying each real variable by  t and dividing by  t.
For any real variable  t in the model, the linearized data-consistent counterpart then reads
^  R
t = ^  t ￿ ^  t.
In our baseline speci￿cation, we estimate the model using eight series of US quarterly data
from 1957Q1 until 1995Q3. These are output, consumption, investment, hours, net business
formation, real wages, in￿ation and the interest rate. These eight time series are used to
identify the eight structural innovations in the theoretical model, see Table 1. Our vector of
observables is thus
Yt = (^  
R
t   ^  
R
t   b   
R
t   ^  E;t  ^  t  ^  
R
t   ^  p;t  ^  t).
Data sources and ￿ltering are as follows. Series for GDP, consumption and investment are
obtained from the US Department of Commerce: Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). As
in Smets and Wouters (2007), personal consumption expenditures include durable goods
consumption. Investment is measured as gross ￿xed private domestic investment, which
abstracts from changes in inventories. Net business formation (NBF) is published in the
BEA￿s Survey of Current Business and covers the majority of US businesses. The original
data source is the Dun and Bradstreet Corporation. This series has been discontinued;
data run from January 1948 to September 1995. Data for hours and wages are from the
US Department of Labor - Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). Following Chang, Gomes
9We use 1,000,000 iterations of the Random Walk Metropolis Hastings algorithm to simulate the posterior
distributions and achieve acceptance rates of about 35% in all our speci￿cations. We discard the initial 4%
of the drawings to compute the posterior moments in each case. We monitor the convergence of the marginal
posterior distributions using CUMSUM statistics as de￿ned by Bauwens, Lubrano and Richard (1999).
13and Schorfheide (2002), who point to the limited coverage of the nonfarm business sector
compared to GDP, we multiply the index of average hours for the nonfarm business sector
(all persons) by civilian employment (16 years and over). The interest rate is the E⁄ective
Federal Funds Rate from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. In￿ation
is measured as the ￿rst di⁄erence of the log implicit price de￿ator of GDP (from the BEA).
All raw series are seasonally adjusted using the Census X12 method. All nominal variables
are de￿ated with the GDP de￿ator. The aggregate real variables are expressed in per capita
terms, by dividing by the Civilian Noninstitutional Population over 16 (from the BLS), and
linearly detrended in logarithmic terms. The in￿ation rate and the nominal interest rate are
demeaned by subtracting their respective sample averages.
2.2 Priors
An overview of our priors can be found in Table 2. Six parameters are ￿xed. The subjective
discount factor is set to C = 0 99, implying a steady state annualized real interest rate of 4%.
Physical capital depreciates at an annual rate of 10%, i.e. EK = 0 025. Similarly, the ￿rm
exit rate is set to EN = 0 025, so as to ￿t the annual job destruction rate of 10% observed in
US data. The parameter of the Cobb-Douglas production function capital share is calibrated
to B = 0 24, which implies a mean labor share in GDP of three quarters. The government
consumes roughly one ￿fth of all goods produced,     C = 0 21. Finally, following Smets
and Wouters (2007) the elasticity of substitution between di⁄erent labor types is set at
 w = 3, implying a net wage markup of 50%.
[ insert Table 2 here ]
The prior distributions on the shock parameters are quite di⁄use, with beta distributions
with mean 0 5 and standard deviation 0 15 for the autoregressive and moving average co-
e¢cients and inverse gamma distributions with mean 0 1 and standard deviation 2 for the
standard errors of the innovations. For most of the structural parameters we use priors
as imposed by Smets and Wouters (2007). The monetary policy parameters, however, are
given gamma distributions, instead of normal distributions, to impose a lower bound of zero.
The Rotemberg price and wage adjustment cost parameters,  p and  w, are assumed to be
14gamma distributed with mean 50 and a standard deviation of 7 5. The mean lies between
the value of  p = 77, estimated by Ireland (2001), and the prior mean of  p =  w = 20
imposed by Krause, Lopez-Salido and Lubik (2008). Moreover, a Rotemberg parameter of
50 corresponds to an average contract duration of about 4 quarters in the Calvo model, a
value which lies in the ballpark of estimates obtained from the New Keynesian Phillips curve
literature. Our results are robust to imposing a smaller prior mean for  p. For the demand
elasticity   we impose a di⁄use normal distribution with mean 4 and standard deviation 1 5.
This suggests an average price markup of 33%, which lies in the middle of the range 20 to
40% that is typically reported for the US average price markup, e.g. Hall (1988), Roeger
(1995), Basu and Fernald (1997), Oliveira Martins and Scarpetta (1999) and Christopoulou
and Vermeulen (2008).
2.3 Posterior Estimates
In the following, we discuss our posterior estimates and contrast them, where possible, with
the existing empirical evidence from the ￿xed-variety literature. Our baseline estimation
results are reported in Table 2, which summarizes the modes, means and the 5th and 95th
percentiles of the posterior distributions. We discuss the mean estimates of the standard
parameters ￿rst, before turning to the entry-related parameters.
While our estimates of the standard parameters are in line with the literature, several ob-
servations are worth making. Compared to business cycle models without entry, see e.g.
Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2007), our estimate of
investment adjustment costs and of capital utilization costs are somewhat higher at about
 K = 8 57 and ~  a = 0 73, respectively. Recall that total investment data is matched with the
sum of intensive and extensive margin investment in our model, whereas in the ￿xed-variety
model the investment series proxies physical capital investment only. For the Rotemberg
price and wage stickiness parameters  p and  w, we obtain values of 61 and 62, respectively,
which corresponds to an average contract duration of about 3 quarters for prices and 2 5
quarters for wages in the Calvo analog.10 These estimates are at the lower end of those
10Strictly speaking, we cannot compute an average price contract duration in our model, as this requires
a constant population of price setters.
15obtained in the macro literature, but are in line with the micro evidence on the frequency
of price adjustment, e.g. Blinder et al. (1998) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2008). Finally,
the estimated degree of price indexation  p = 0 51 is somewhat higher than the value of 0 24
reported in Smets and Wouters (2007). This di⁄erence may come from our higher NKPC
slope estimate, which implies a higher in￿ation volatility for a given value of price indexation.
Adjustment costs in entry are estimated at 1 96. This is substantially lower than the value
above 8 reported in Lewis and Poilly (2012), who estimate a model similar to the one
presented above by impulse response matching techniques. These di⁄erent results can be
explained by the di⁄erent stochastic structures of the two models. In Lewis and Poilly (2012),
￿uctuations are driven only by monetary policy shocks. Here, however, we consider a range
of shocks. To our knowledge, no other empirical evidence on this parameter exists.
Our main parameter of interest is the price-elasticity of demand, which determines the steady
state markup, the competition e⁄ect, as well as consumers￿ love of variety. We ￿nd a mean
estimate of   = 5 64 in our baseline estimation, which implies that price markups are 22% on
average. While this estimate lies in the ballpark of many micro studies of average markups,
e.g. Christopoulou and Vermeulen (2008), it is signi￿cantly lower than the 60% steady state
markup implied by the Smets and Wouters￿ (2007) model with ￿xed costs and no entry.
Lewis and Poilly (2012), whose set of observables includes a markup measure, also ￿nd a
lower demand elasticity (  = 2 5). In Section 5 we investigate the sensitivity of our results
to alternative speci￿cations and sets of observables.
Turning to the derived parameters, the posterior distribution of   implies that the compe-
tition e⁄ect  , the inverse of the demand elasticity has a mean value of   = 0 18. Hence,
desired markups fall by 0 18% in response to a 1% increase in the number of ￿rms. Cecioni
(2010) uses single-equation techniques to estimate the New Keynesian Phillips Curve (10).
She ￿nds a competition e⁄ect of 1 2. In her model, the competition e⁄ect is supply-driven and
stems from an oligopolistic market structure. In contrast, our model with translog expen-
diture cannot generate a competition e⁄ect above unity given the lower bound the demand
elasticity,   ￿ 1. While our estimate of the competition e⁄ect is statistically signi￿cant, we
investigate below if this e⁄ect is also economically important in driving in￿ation. From the
model￿s steady state, we can compute the steady state number of ￿rms. Given the relation
16between the demand elasticity   and the number of ￿rms   (which we compute using the
calibrated parameters and the posterior mean of  ) in (5), we derive the price-elasticity of
the spending share D = 0 52. Thus, in response to a 1% price increase for an individual
variety, the spending share drops by 0 52%.
3 Markups and the Competition E⁄ect
This section analyzes markup dynamics in the presence of the competition e⁄ect as predicted
by the model. First, we highlight how the competition e⁄ect works conditional on a speci￿c
shock. Second, we examine the unconditional properties of the model-implied markup, in
particular its cyclicality.
3.1 Transmission Channels
The eight structural shocks are grouped as follows. TFP shocks ^  
Z
t , entry cost shocks ^  
E
t
and shocks to wage in￿ation ^  
W
t constitute ￿supply shocks￿, which a⁄ect marginal costs
of production in (one of) the two sectors. Government spending shocks ^  
G
t , investment-
speci￿c technology shocks ^  
I
t and time preference shocks ^  
T
t are classi￿ed as ￿demand shocks￿.
Monetary policy shocks ^  
R
t and desired markup shocks ^  
P
t are treated as separate categories.
Note that we consider expansionary shocks throughout; all shocks have been normalized to
produce a(n eventual) rise in GDP.
3.1.1 Supply Shocks
Figure 1a depicts the impulse responses of selected variables to the three supply shocks.
Consider the ￿rst two panels showing the dynamics triggered by shocks to TFP and wage
markups. Favorable movements in both shocks, i.e. positive TFP shocks and negative wage
markup shocks, lower real marginal costs in both sectors. Prices are sticky and do not fall
by the same amount. Therefore, actual markups rise, which increases pro￿ts through (8).
The fall in entry costs induced by the shock leads to entry (16) and a gradual decline in
desired markups via the competition e⁄ect (6). Consequently, in response to ￿standard￿
supply shocks, the competition e⁄ect mitigates the procyclical e⁄ect of price stickiness on
markups. After about 6 to 8 quarters, the competition e⁄ect dominates and actual markups
17falls.
[ insert Figure 1a here ]
The transmission of entry cost shocks deserves special attention since this type of shock
is speci￿c to the endogenous-entry framework. An exogenous decrease in startup costs
directly raises entry through (16). The number of producers and goods rises too, though
only gradually and after a one-period lag, see (14). This leads to an eventual decrease in
the desired markup through the competition e⁄ect (6). Initially, the rise in investment in
new ￿rms induces a reallocation of production factors from the manufacturing sector to
new startups, implying a decrease in GDP on impact. However, the economic downturn is
short-lived, as the rise in extensive margin investment eventually pushes output above steady
state. The ensuing rise in aggregate demand raises marginal costs and prices. Due to price
adjustment costs, prices rise less than marginal costs, such that actual markups decrease.
Desired markups decrease by less than desired markups. Therefore, in￿ation rises through
the New Keynesian Phillips Curve (9).
3.1.2 Demand Shocks
Next, we examine the propagation of demand shocks. We notice from Figure 1b that all
three shocks generate strong crowding-out e⁄ects at the extensive margin; entry drops. The
monetary policy tightening in reaction to expansionary demand shocks implies an increase
in the real interest rate. This, in turn, lowers ￿rm value through (15). Combined with an
increase in entry costs (marginal costs increase together with aggregate demand), this leads
to a fall in entry through (16), increasing desired markups via the competition e⁄ect (6). The
dominant e⁄ect on markups, however, comes from price stickiness. An exogenous increase in
demand raises marginal production costs more than prices, inducing actual markups to fall.
The competition e⁄ect thus mitigates the countercyclical response of markups to demand
shocks.
[ insert Figure 1b here ]
Expansionary shocks to government spending and investment-speci￿c technology are followed
by an (eventual) increase in pro￿ts. This is explained by the rise in output that dominates
18the decline in the actual markup in (8). In contrast, in response to time preference shocks,
pro￿ts fall. This is because the output increase is smaller compare with the other two shocks.
Hence the negative e⁄ect of falling markups on pro￿ts dominates. Notice also that the e⁄ects
of the time preference shock are short-lived due to the low shock persistence ( T = 0 29, see
Table 2).
3.1.3 Monetary Policy Shocks
Concerning the monetary policy shock (displayed in the top panel of Figure 1c), two model
predictions stand out. First, the model predicts that aggregate pro￿ts decrease following
an expansionary monetary policy shock. This is in contrast to evidence reported in Lewis
(2009) and Lewis and Poilly (2012). However, it is in line with Bilbiie, Ghironi and Melitz
(2007). A decline in the interest rate leads to a marginal cost rise and, given that prices
do not adjust fully, to a decrease in actual markups, which in turn depresses pro￿ts. The
greater the price-elasticity of demand  , the greater this e⁄ect of markups on pro￿ts, see
(8). At the same time, a decline in the interest rate has expansionary e⁄ects on aggregate
demand ^   C
t , which raises pro￿ts. Our estimates imply that the ￿rst e⁄ect dominates the
second e⁄ect, such that pro￿ts decrease on net.
Notice the di⁄erence with Lewis and Poilly (2012), who ￿nd that pro￿ts rise in response to a
monetary expansion. There are two reasons for this di⁄erence. First, our demand elasticity
  is larger, which makes the ￿rst e⁄ect more important. Second, the model in Lewis and
Poilly (2012) includes working capital. Thus, if ^  t decreases, marginal costs do not rise as
much given that the interest rate decline puts downward pressures on marginal costs.
Second, the model predicts that despite the decrease in pro￿ts, entry rises in reaction to a
loosening of monetary policy. This is in line with the evidence reported in Bergin and Corsetti
(2008), Lewis (2009) and Lewis and Poilly (2012). The explanation is that the interest rate
decline leads to a decrease in the expected return on shares to eliminate arbitrage across
assets. The expected return on shares falls through a rise in the current relative to the
future share price. This rise in ￿rm value exceeds the rise in marginal costs (i.e. entry
costs). On balance therefore, entry expands, which in turn decreases the desired markup
through (6). As a result, the competition e⁄ect augments the countercyclical e⁄ect of price
19stickiness on markups in the case of monetary policy shocks.
[ insert Figure 1c here ]
3.1.4 Desired Markup Shocks
The bottom panel in Figure 1c shows the e⁄ects of an exogenous drop in desired markups
(a decrease in ^  
P
t ). By (11), the spending share becomes more price-elastic and via (6) the
desired markup decreases. This lowers in￿ation through the New Keynesian Phillips Curve
(9) and boosts demand. The ensuing boom drives up real marginal costs; because of price
stickiness, actual markups fall. Aggregate pro￿ts decrease, as the decrease in the actual
markup ^  t dominates the rise in demand ^   C
t in the pro￿t expression (8). Entry costs rise
by more than ￿rm value, such that entry contracts.
To sum up, the model predicts a procyclical entry response to supply shocks and to monetary
policy shocks, but a countercyclical response to demand shocks. As a result, through the
competition e⁄ect, desired markups are countercyclical in response to supply shocks and
monetary policy shocks, but procyclical following demand shocks. The competition e⁄ect
therefore augments the countercyclical e⁄ect of price stickiness on markups in the case of
monetary policy shocks, whereas it counteracts the sticky price e⁄ects on markups in response
to supply and demand shocks. Exogenous disturbances to the desired markup eventually
lead to countercyclical entry.
3.2 The Cyclicality of the Markup
Here we study the unconditional cyclicality of the markup implied by the model. We conduct
300 stochastic simulations based on random draws from the posterior distribution and back
out, for each of these simulations, the model-implied markup ^  t, the counterfactual markup
in the absence of the competition e⁄ect ^  
noCE
t and the ￿sticky-price￿ markup ^  
SP
t . To compute
^  
noCE
t we set the competition e⁄ect to zero (  = 0) in the stochastic simulation. Finally,
to compute the sticky price markup, we set   = 0 and perform the stochastic simulation,
excluding the desired markup shock (^  
P
t = 0). The resulting markup series, denoted ^  
SP
t , is
the counterfactual markup that one would obtain if desired markups were constant.
20Similar to Bilbiie, Ghironi and Melitz (2011), we then compute for each of the model simula-
tions the correlation of the three markup series with output at various leads and lags. Since
our model includes a whole array of structural shocks, this exercise should provide a real-
istic description of what a DSGE model with endogenous entry implies for (unconditional)
markup variations. Figure 2 plots the mean and the 5th and 95th percentile correlations
    (^   R
t+s  ^  t),     (^   R
t+s  ^  
noCE
t ) and     (^   R
t+s  ^  
SP
t ) for   = ￿5 ￿4     0     5.
[ insert Figure 2 here ]
The model-implied markup is countercyclical at all leads and lags. If we switch o⁄ the
competition e⁄ect, the correlation between the markup and output rises; the contempora-
neous correlation     (^   R
t   ^  
noCE
t ) is not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero. If, in addition, we
eliminate desired markup shocks, the cyclicality turns positive: the sticky-price markup is
signi￿cantly procyclical. Thus, it is the combination of the competition e⁄ect and desired
markup shocks that reverses the sign of the markup-output correlation. Recall from Figures
1a-c that entry is procyclical in response to supply shocks and monetary policy shocks (such
that the competition e⁄ect leads to countercyclical markups), but countercyclical in response
to demand shocks (such that the competition e⁄ect leads to procyclical markups). The re-
sult that ^  t is countercyclical re￿ects the importance of supply shocks in driving aggregate
￿uctuations.
Figure 3 presents a forecast error variance decomposition for output ^   R
t , in￿ation ^  p;t and
markups ^  t. For these three variables, TFP and wage markup shocks are an important
source of volatility, while entry cost shocks hardly matter.11
[ insert Figure 3 here ]
Long run output variability is explained almost entirely by two supply shocks: wage markup
shocks (50%) and TFP shocks (40%). In the short run, the sources of output ￿uctuations are
more mixed: government spending shocks and TFP each account for one ￿fth, investment-
speci￿c technology for one third. The variation in the markup is mainly accounted for by a
combination of TFP, wage markup shocks and price markup shocks.
11Most of the variability in entry is explained by its own shock ^  
E
t , which points to a poor performance
of the model in generating ￿rm dynamics endogenously. More detailed results are available from the authors
upon request.
21To conclude, we ￿nd a major role of supply-type shocks in driving output and markup
￿uctuations. Since, through the competition e⁄ect, supply shocks are a source of markup
countercyclicality, the model-implied correlation between markups and output is negative
overall.
4 A Counterfactual Analysis of US In￿ation Dynamics
This section examines in greater detail the sources of in￿ation dynamics in US data. We aim
to assess the risk of misguided cyclical monetary policy when in￿ation ￿uctuations result
from endogenous market structure changes.12 To this end, we decompose US in￿ation, into a
sticky-price component plus two components re￿ecting endogenous and exogenous variations
in the desired markup.
Our premise here is that the objective of monetary policy is to close gaps, i.e. to stabilize
in￿ation which ￿uctuates in response to markup variations induced, in turn, by nominal
rigidities. This is the optimal prescription for monetary policy in the New Keynesian tradi-
tion, see Woodford (2003) and Gal￿ (2008). Bergin and Corsetti (2008) and Bilbiie, Ghironi
and Melitz (2007) show that this optimal policy prescription carries over to the more recent
business cycle literature on endogenous entry, provided that ￿scal instruments are used to
address ine¢ciencies at the steady state. The consensus here is that the central bank should
let number of ￿rms ￿uctuate freely and should not respond to changes in in￿ation arising
from entry and exit.13
Suppose the central bank observes a fall in in￿ation. It may face a signal extraction problem
in that it cannot tell whether (part of) this fall is due to stronger competition from a larger
number of producers that compresses desired markups. In response to receding in￿ationary
pressures the central bank is set to loosen its monetary policy stance. In times of weakening
aggregate demand, such a policy response is warranted. In this case, sticky-price ￿rms are
12Note that we abstract from the implications of entry for the optimal long run in￿ation rate, which are
analysed in Bilbiie, Fujiwara and Ghironi (2011).
13In fact, optimal cyclical monetary policy in the presence of endogenous entry is somewhat more com-
plicated. There are two opposing e⁄ects on welfare: a positive variety e⁄ect (through increased product
diversity) and a negative ￿business stealing e⁄ect￿ (through decreased pro￿ts). While these two externalities
exactly o⁄set each other in the case of Dixit-Stiglitz preferences, they do not under translog preferences. We
abstract from possible net externalties at the business cycle frequency by assuming that the central bank
wishes not to target in￿ation changes due to the competition e⁄ect, which it regards as e¢cient.
22unable to fully adjust prices downward as they would under perfect price ￿exibility, such
that actual markups increase and in￿ation drops. However, loosening monetary policy is
not the right response if ￿rm entry has risen, e.g. because market deregulation measures
have lowered entry costs, decreasing desired markups and in￿ation through the competition
e⁄ect. Thus, we wish to gauge the economic importance of the competition e⁄ect, in order
to assess the likelihood of such mistaken policy actions.
In the following, we perform a counterfactual analysis of US in￿ation. We ￿lter out the
contribution of exogenous desired markup shocks to in￿ation. To this end, we feed the shock
series ^  
P
t into the model, setting all other shocks to zero, and denote the resulting in￿ation
series ^  
P
p;t. In addition, we are interested in two types of endogenous driving forces of in￿ation.
The ￿rst ^  
SP
p;t captures the endogenous sticky-price channel of in￿ation ￿uctuations that
characterizes the (hybrid) New Keynesian model. Through this channel, current in￿ation
is driven by marginal costs and expected future in￿ation (through price stickiness) and
by lagged in￿ation (through indexation to past in￿ation). We set all parameter values to
their baseline estimates in Table 2, except for the competition e⁄ect, which we set to zero,
  = 0. Then, we feed the shocks into the model, excluding the desired markup shock ^  
P
t .
The resulting in￿ation path is what we call ￿sticky-price in￿ation￿, determined through the
modi￿ed New Keynesian Phillips Curve,
^  
SP
p;t ￿  p^  
SP
p;t￿1 =
  ￿ 1
 p
(￿^  
SP
t ) + C (1 ￿ EN) tf^  
SP
p;t+1 ￿  p^  
SP
p;t g.
The ￿sticky-price markup￿ ^  
SP
t is the counterfactual markup series that we obtain under
constant desired markups, that is, in the absence of a competition e⁄ect and desired markup
shocks. The second endogenous component ^  
CE
p;t denotes the competition e⁄ect of entry on
in￿ation, and is computed as the actual in￿ation rate, less sticky-price in￿ation, less the
contribution of desired markup shocks,
^  
CE
p;t = ^  p;t ￿ ^  
SP
p;t ￿ ^  
P
p;t 
Figure 4a plots the quarterly in￿ation rate in the US from 1957q1 to 1995q2 and its three
components ^  
SP
p;t , ^  
CE
p;t and ^  
P
p;t.
[ insert Figure 4a here ]
23Compared with the sticky-price component and the exogenous component, the competition
e⁄ect plays a rather minor role in driving US in￿ation.14 Only in the 1970s and 1980s did
the competition e⁄ect exert any noticeable (downward) pressure on in￿ation. Therefore, it is
unlikely that monetary policy reacts unwittingly to in￿ation changes unrelated to (endoge-
nous or exogenous) price distortions. Furthermore, the competition e⁄ect appears to account
mainly for low frequency movements in the in￿ation rate. This indicates that - to the extent
that competition e⁄ect induce ine¢ciencies - these can be dealt with more appropriately
with policy instruments other than monetary policy.
Figure 3 con￿rms the importance of desired price markup shocks for in￿ation. In the short
run, such shocks account for over half of in￿ation ￿uctuations.
As a robustness check, we estimated the model for the period 1993q2-2007q4 where entry
 E;t is measured as the number of establishment births, see Section 5. Our previous ￿nding
is con￿rmed in the later sample: the competition e⁄ect explains a small part of US in￿ation.
See Figure 4b.
[ insert Figure 4b here ]
5 Sensitivity Analysis
This section focuses on the sensitivity of our demand elasticity estimate   to ￿ve alternative
model speci￿cations. First, we replace the time preference shock with a risk premium shock
that a⁄ects the real interest rate. Second, we treat pro￿ts as an additional observable
variable and extend the model by adding a white-noise measurement error to (8). Third,
we estimate the Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) model with a constant elasticity of substitution (CES)
aggregator on our original set of observables. Fourth, we consider the asymmetric production
structure favored by Bilbiie, Ghironi and Melitz (2011), where new ￿rms are set up using
labor services only. Finally, we consider di⁄erent mappings between entry in the model and
business formation in the data.
[ insert Table 3 here ]
The results of these robustness exercises are displayed in Table 3. We discuss them in turn.
14We made the same decomposition for GDP and found a similar picture: the competition e⁄ect accounts
for a small fraction of output ￿uctuations, in contrast with the result in Floetotto and Jaimovich (2008).
245.1 Risk Premium Shock
Smets and Wouters (2007) propose a demand-type shock that generates co-movement be-
tween consumption and investment. Following this idea, we stipulate that the return to
one-period nominal bonds is multiplied by a random variable  RP
t , which in logarithmic
terms follows a ￿rst-order autoregressive process with persistence  RP and standard devia-
tion  RP. We call this variable a ￿risk premium shock￿. It re￿ects an exogenous risk premium
on bond holdings, which drives a wedge between the bond return and the risk-free rate set
by the central bank. While the time preference shock of the baseline model a⁄ected only the
Euler equation for bonds, the risk premium shock enters all three asset pricing equations. In
the optimality condition for bonds (12), ^  
T
t is replaced with ^  
RP
t . In the ￿rst order conditions
for capital (13) and equity (15), the shock ^  
RP
t enters the right hand side with a negative
sign.
Figure 5 shows the impulse responses of some key variables to an expansionary risk premium
shock. As output and in￿ation move in the same direction, we consider this as a demand-type
shock. However, in contrast with the three demand shocks in Figure 1b, the risk premium
shock generates a procyclical response of entry and therefore a countercyclical competition
e⁄ect, which dampens in￿ation.
[ insert Figure 5 here ]
The estimation results of this alternative model are shown in Table 3 in the column entitled
￿Risk-P￿. The parameter estimates are similar to the baseline estimates; all con￿dence inter-
vals overlap. The only noteworthy di⁄erence between the two sets of estimates is that the
risk premium shock itself is signi￿cantly bigger and more persistent than the time preference
shock.
5.2 Using Pro￿t Data in Estimation
In a second exercise, we investigate whether considering pro￿t data in our estimation greatly
changes the results. In particular, we add data-consistent aggregate pro￿ts ^  R
t = ^  t+ ^  t￿^  t
to the set of observables Yt. To avoid stochastic singularity - a problem that arises when
having more variables than shocks - we include an exogenous iid normal error term ^  
D
t with
25mean zero and standard deviation  D in the measurement equation of ￿rm pro￿ts, such that
(8) becomes
^  
R
t = (  ￿ 1) ^  t + ^  
C
t ￿ ^  t + ^  
D
t .
Quarterly data for corporate pro￿ts after taxes are taken from the NIPA tables. The pa-
rameter estimates are summarized in column ￿P￿ of Table 3. The mean demand elasticity
increases to about   = 8 38 when we include pro￿ts, which lowers the competition e⁄ect.15
This can be explained by the large volatility of pro￿ts in the data and con￿rms the ￿pro￿t
volatility puzzle￿. Small changes in the markup can generate large pro￿t movements only if
the corresponding elasticity,   ￿ 1, is large, see (8). From existing research we know that
neither the ￿xed-variety DSGE model (see Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans, 2005), nor
the endogenous-entry model (see Colciago and Etro, 2010; Lewis and Poilly, 2012) succeeds
in explaining well the observed pro￿t dynamics.
5.3 CES Aggregator
In light of our result that the contribution of the competition e⁄ect to in￿ation dynamics is
rather small, it is instructive to compare our baseline model featuring a translog expenditure
function with the Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) model assuming CES aggregator. In the latter model,
the demand elasticity   is constant and equal to the elasticity of substitution between vari-
eties. Consequently, desired markups are also constant, such that ^  
d
t = 0. Another model
feature is that the love of variety is equal to the net steady state markup   ￿ 1 = 1
"￿1. The
results are reported in column ￿CES￿ of Table 3. None of our parameter estimates change
signi￿cantly relative to our baseline model. Thus, allowing for competition e⁄ects and a
variable demand elasticity does not change our conclusions about the short-run dynamics of
macroeconomic variables, including net business formation.
15The value   = 8 38 lies in the upper tail of the prior distribution. The cumulative probability at this
value equals 0 998. Therefore, our prior distribution might be too restrictive relative to the information
captured in the data. In an additional robustness check available upon request, we impose a looser prior on
 , namely a gamma distribution with mean 4 and standard deviation 2 5. In this case   slightly increases to
8 88, which lies within the 90% con￿dence interval of the prior distribution.
265.4 Asymmetric Sectors
As a fourth robustness check, we consider an alternative speci￿cation for entry costs con-
sisting only of labor costs. Concretely, in the technology with which new ￿rms are produced
(7), BE is set to zero. The last column of Table 3 reports the parameter estimates under
the heading ￿AsymPF￿. Two observations stand out. First, the demand elasticity increases
relative to the baseline estimate. Second, as   increases, the price indexation parameter
 p also increases. A possible explanation is that, as noted by Bilbiie, Ghironi and Melitz
(2007), the endogenous-entry NKPC entails more in￿ation persistence because the number
of varieties  t is a state variable. Hence, the higher is the demand elasticity, the smaller
is the competition e⁄ect and the less important is the endogenous persistence generated by
entry, necessitating a higher degree of indexation.16
5.5 Mapping between Model and Data
Finally, we investigate whether the mapping of entry in the model and business formation
in the data is important. We do this in order to address the concern that our net business
formation index is a measure of net entry, while the model variable  E;t corresponds to gross
entry.
First, we match net business formation in the data with net entry in the model, which we
de￿ne as  NE;t. Net entry equals entry  E;t minus exit E( t +  E;t). Net entry in steady
state is zero. Therefore, we express net entry in deviations from the steady state number of
entrants,
^  NE;t = (1 ￿ E)( ^  E;t ￿ ^  t).
The estimation results are not strongly a⁄ected by this alternative mapping, see Table 3,
column ￿NE￿. This is not surprising since exit is exogenous in the model.
Second, we match  E;t in the model with the number of ￿New Incorporations￿, a data series
provided by the BEA￿s Survey of Current Business together with net business formation.
The sample period is almost the same as in the baseline estimation. We do not observe a
16Note that love of variety also generates some additional persistence. Even after transforming the model
as explained in Section 3.1, the variety e⁄ect does not vanish in the case where risk aversion  C is greater
than 1 and/or habits   are greater than 0. See also Lewis and Poilly (2012).
27large impact on estimation results (Table 3, column ￿NI￿) other than a drop in the entry
adjustment cost parameter  N.
Third, we use an alternative measure of ￿rm entry based on establishment data. The column
￿Births￿ shows the estimation results when  E;t is measured as ￿Establishment Births￿. Data
are obtained from the BLS and span the period 1993q2-2007q4.17 Also here, the entry
adjustment cost drops signi￿cantly. In addition, the monetary policy response to output
and the properties of some of the shock processes are changed. Importantly, the estimates
of the key parameters of interest,   and  , are una⁄ected when we use establishment entry
instead of ￿rm entry.
In sum, our estimates of the demand elasticity and the competition e⁄ect are robust to
alternative ways of mapping entry in the model to the data.
6 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the empirical importance of changes in market structure and compe-
tition for business cycle dynamics in the US. By ￿competition e⁄ect￿ we mean an inverse
relationship between markups and entry rates as observed in the industrial organization
literature. In response to expanding pro￿t opportunities, more ￿rms and products enter,
which heightens competitive pressures and reduces desired markups and in￿ation. To quan-
tify the relevance of this mechanism for cyclical ￿uctuations, we estimate - using Bayesian
methods - a sticky-price business cycle model with sunk-cost driven entry dynamics and a
translog expenditure function. We obtain two main results. Our ￿rst ￿nding is that the
impact of the competition e⁄ect on markups and in￿ation is shock-dependent. In the case
of supply shocks and monetary policy shocks, entry is procyclical. Thus, the competition
e⁄ect generates countercyclical markups and dampens in￿ation. The opposite is true for
demand shocks. Overall, the model-implied markup is countercyclical, due to a combination
of desired markup shocks and the competition e⁄ect. In a counterfactual exercise where
sticky prices are the only source of markup variations, the model-implied markup is, in
17We estimate the model on data up to the start of the Great Recession. During a period where the
economy is at the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates, the postulated monetary policy rule is no
longer applicable. Including the most recent period would distort our estimates.
28contrast, procyclical. Second, the estimated competition e⁄ect equals 0.18. A one percent
increase in the number of ￿rms and goods decreases desired markups by 0.18 percent. US
in￿ation is driven mainly by a combination of sticky prices and exogenous markup shocks.
The contribution of the competition e⁄ect to in￿ation ￿uctuations is limited.
References
[1] Basu, S., Fernald, J., 1997. Returns to Scale in U.S. Production: Estimates and Impli-
cations. Journal of Political Economy 105(2), 249-283.
[2] Bauwens, L., Lubrano, M., Richard, J.F., 1999. Bayesian Inference in Dynamic Econo-
metric Models. Oxford University Press.
[3] Bergin, P., Corsetti, G., 2008. The Extensive Margin and Monetary Policy. Journal of
Monetary Economics 55(7), 1222-1237.
[4] Bilbiie, F., Fujiwara, I., Ghironi, F., 2011. Optimal Monetary Policy with Endogenous
Entry and Product Variety. CEPR Discussion Paper No. 8565.
[5] Bilbiie, F., Ghironi, F., Melitz, M., 2007. Monetary Policy and Business Cycles with
Endogenous Entry and Product Variety. NBER Macroeconomics Annual 22, 299-353.
[6] Bilbiie, F., Ghironi, F., Melitz, M., 2011. Endogenous Entry, Product Variety, and Busi-
ness Cycles. Journal of Political Economy, forthcoming. https://www2.bc.edu/fabio-
ghironi/BGMRBC.pdf.
[7] Bils, M., 1987. The Cyclical Behavior of Marginal Cost and Price. American Economic
Review 77(5), 838-857.
[8] Blinder, A.S., Canetti, E., Lebow, D., Rudd, J., 1998. Asking About Prices: A New
Approach to Understanding Price Stickiness. Russell Sage Foundation, New York.
[9] Campbell, J.R., Hopenhayn, H.A., 2005. Market Size Matters. Journal of Industrial
Economics 53(1), 1-25.
29[10] Cecioni, M., 2010. Firm Entry, Competitive Pressures and the U.S. In￿ation Dynamics.
Temi di discussione 773, Bank of Italy.
[11] Chang, Y., Gomes, J., Schorfheide, F., 2002. Learning-by-Doing as Propagation Mech-
anism. American Economic Review 92(5), 1498-1520.
[12] Christiano, L.J., Eichenbaum, M., Evans, C.L., 2005. Nominal Rigidities and the Dy-
namic E⁄ects of a Shock to Monetary Policy. Journal of Political Economy 113(1), 1-45.
[13] Christopoulou, R., Vermeulen, P., 2008. Markups in the Euro Area and the US over the
Period 1981-2004 - A Comparison of 50 Sectors. Working Paper Series 856, European
Central Bank.
[14] Colciago, A., Etro, F., 2010. Endogenous Market Structures and the Business Cycle.
Economic Journal 120(549), 1201-1233.
[15] Dixit, A.K., Stiglitz, J.E., 1977. Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Di-
versity. American Economic Review 67(3), 297-308.
[16] Erceg, C.J., Henderson, D.W., Levin, A.T., 2000. Optimal Monetary Policy with Stag-
gered Wage and Price Contracts. Journal of Monetary Economics 46(2), 281-313.
[17] Feenstra, R.C., 2003. A Homothetic Utility Function for Monopolistic Competition
Models, without Constant Price Elasticity. Economics Letters 78(1), 79-86.
[18] Fernandez-Villaverde, J., Rubio-Ramirez, J.F., 2004. Comparing Dynamic Equilibrium
Economies to Data: A Bayesian Approach. Journal of Econometrics 123(1), 153-187.
[19] Floetotto, M., Jaimovich, N., 2008. Firm Dynamics, Markup Variations, and the Busi-
ness Cycle. Journal of Monetary Economics 55(7), 1238-1252.
[20] Gal￿, J., 2008. Monetary Policy, In￿ation and the Business Cycle: An Introduction to
the New Keynesian Framework. Princeton University Press.
[21] Hall, R.E., 1988. The Relation between Price and Marginal Cost in U.S. Industry.
Journal of Political Economy 96(5), 921-947.
30[22] Ireland, P.N., 2001. Sticky-Price Models of the Business Cycle: Speci￿cation and Sta-
bility. Journal of Monetary Economics 47(1), 3-18.
[23] Krause, M.U., Lopez-Salido, D., Lubik, T.A., 2008. In￿ation Dynamics with Search
Frictions: A Structural Econometric Analysis. Journal of Monetary Economics 55(5),
892-916.
[24] Lewis, V., Poilly, C., 2012. Firm Entry, Markups and the Monetary Transmission Mech-
anism. Manuscript.
[25] Lewis, V., 2009. Business Cycle Evidence on Firm Entry. Macroeconomic Dynamics
13(5), 605-624.
[26] Nakamura, E., Steinsson, J., 2008. Five Facts about Prices: A Reevaluation of Menu
Cost Models. Quarterly Journal of Economics 123(4), 1415-1464.
[27] Nekarda, C., Ramey, V., 2010. The Cyclical Behavior of the Price-Cost Markup.
http://weber.ucsd.edu/~vramey/research/markupcyc.pdf.
[28] Oliveira Martins, J., Scarpetta, S., 1999. The Levels and Cyclical Behaviour of Mark-
ups across Countries and Market Structures. OECD, Economics Department Working
Paper No. 213.
[29] Roeger, W., 1995. Can Imperfect Competition Explain the Di⁄erence between Primal
and Dual Measures? Estimates for US Manufacturing. Journal of Political Economy
103(2), 316-330.
[30] Rotemberg, J.J., 1982. Monopolistic Price Adjustment and Aggregate Output. Review
of Economic Studies 49(4), 517-31.
[31] Rotemberg, J.J., Woodford, M., 1999. The Cyclical Behavior of Prices and Costs. In:
Taylor, J.B., Woodford, M. (eds), Handbook of Macroeconomics, Elsevier Amsterdam,
pp. 1051-1135.
[32] Smets, F., Wouters, R., 2003. An Estimated Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium
Model of the Euro Area. Journal of the European Economic Association 1(5), 1123-1175.
31[33] Smets, F., Wouters, R., 2007. Shocks and Frictions in US Business Cycles: A Bayesian
DSGE Approach. American Economic Review 97(3), 586-606.
[34] Woodford, M., 2003. Interest and Prices: Foundations of a Theory of Monetary Policy.
Princeton University Press.
Table 1: Exogenous Shock Processes
Total factor productivity shock ^  
Z
t =  Z^  
Z
t￿1 + ^  
Z
t
Investment-speci￿c technology shock ^  
I
t =  I^  
I
t￿1 + ^  
I
t
Time preference shock ^  
T
t =  T^  
T
t￿1 + ^  
T
t
Government spending shock ^  
G
t =  G^  
G
t￿1 + ^  
G
t +  GZ^  
Z
t
Price markup shock ^  
P
t =  P^  
P
t￿1 + ^  
P
t ￿  P^  
P
t￿1
Wage markup shock ^  
W
t =  W^  
W
t￿1 + ^  
W
t ￿  W^  
W
t￿1
Monetary policy shock ^  
R
t =  R^  
R
t￿1 + ^  
R
t
Entry cost shock ^  
E
t =  E^  
E
t￿1 + ^  
E
t
Note: In each shock process  , the innovations b  
i
t are independently and identically
distributed random variables following a normal distribution with mean zero and
variance  2
i.
32Table 2: Estimation Results: Baseline 
 
ESTIMATED STRUCTURAL PARAMETERS  Posterior  SHOCKS AR(1), MA(1)  Posterior 
     
 
 
  
 
 
  Symbol  Description  Prior (P1,P2)  Mode  Mean [5
th; 95
th %ile
 ]   Symbol  Prior (P1,P2)  Mode  Mean [5
th; 95
th %ile
 ] 
     
 
 
  
 
 
  b  Consumption habit  B (0.70, 0.10)  0.57  0.57 [0.47; 0.67]  ??  B (0.50, 0.15)  0.98  0.98 [0.97;0.99] 
??  Consumption utility  N (1.5, 0.375)  1.55  1.49 [1.12; 1.87]  ??  B (0.50, 0.15)  0.25  0.29 [0.14; 0.43] 
??  Consumption labor  N (2.00, 0.75)  1.58  1.55 [0.84; 2.25]  ??  B (0.50, 0.15)  0.41  0.41 [0.32; 0.51] 
     
 
 
??  B (0.50, 0.15)  0.89  0.89 [0.86; 0.92] 
??  Investment adj. cost  N (4.00, 1.50)  8.23  8.57 [6.55; 10.57]  ??  B (0.50, 0.15)  0.77  0.75 [0.66; 0.84] 
??  Entry adj. cost  N (4.00, 1.50)  1.75  1.96 [1.37; 2.50]  ??  B (0.50, 0.15)  0.98  0.97 [0.95; 0.99] 
? �?  Capacity util. cost  B (0.50, 0.15)  0.70  0.73 [0.59; 0.87]  ??  B (0.50, 0.15)  0.23  0.24 [0.13; 0.34] 
     
 
 
??  B (0.50, 0.15)  0.84  0.85 [0.81; 0.89] 
??  Indexation prices  B (0.50, 0.15)  0.46  0.51 [0.30; 0.71]  ???  B (0.50, 0.15)  0.77  0.74 [0.58; 0.91] 
??  Price rigidity  G (50.0, 7.50)  61.18  60.82 [48.31; 72.83]  ??  B (0.50, 0.15)  0.66  0.64 [0.49; 0.79] 
??  Indexation wages  B (0.50, 0.15)  0.55  0.53 [0.34; 0.72]  ??  B (0.50, 0.15)  0.52  0.49 [0.32; 0.65] 
??  Wage rigidity  G (50.0, 7.50)  59.10  61.60 [48.40; 74.38] 
   
 
 
     
 
     
 
  ?  Demand elasticity  N (4.00, 1.50)  5.38  5.64 [4.50; 6.77] 
   
 
  ?  Competition effect 
 
0.17  0.18 [0.15; 0.22] 
   
 
 
     
 
 
SHOCK INNOVATIONS   
??  Interest smoothing  B (0.75, 0.10)  0.71  0.72 [0.66; 0.77] 
   
 
  ??  Policy inflation  G (1.50, 0.25)  1.68  1.76 [1.49; 2.02]  ??  IG (0.10, 2)  0.82  0.83 [0.75; 0.91] 
??  Policy output  G (0.50, 0.25)  0.05  0.06 [0.02; 0.10]  ??  IG (0.10, 2)  0.23  0.23 [0.19; 0.28] 
???  Policy lagged output  G (0.50, 0.25)  0.36  0.37 [0.28; 0.46]  ??  IG (0.10, 2)  1.39  1.41 [1.15; 1.66] 
     
 
 
??  IG (0.10, 2)  3.19  3.21 [2.86; 3.56] 
CALIBRATED STRUCTURAL PARAMETERS   
 
??  IG (0.10, 2)  0.26  0.28 [0.22; 0.35] 
     
 
 
??  IG (0.10, 2)  0.39  0.38 [0.31; 0.45] 
?  Discount factor 
 
  0.99  ??  IG (0.10, 2)  0.26  0.27 [0.23; 0.30] 
?  Capital share in production    0.24  ??  IG (0.10, 2)  2.70  2.87 [2.40; 3.34] 
??  Firm exit rate    0.025 
   
 
  ??  Capital depreciation  rate    0.025 
   
 
  ??  Elasticity of substitution labor types    3 
   
 
  G/Y
c  Exogenous spending share    0.21 
   
 
   
Note: B = Beta, G = Gamma, IG = Inverse Gamma and N = Normal distributions. P1 = Mean and P2 = Standard 
deviation for all distributions. Posterior moments are computed using 960,000 draws from the distribution simulated 
by the Random Walk Metropolis Hastings algorithm. 
 Table 3: Sensitivity Analysis 
 
   
PRIOR  POSTERIOR DISTRIBUTION: Mean [5
th; 95
th %ile
 ] 
Symbol  Description  (P1,P2)  Risk-P  P  CES  Asym-PF 
       
  
 
 
STRUCTURAL PARAMETERS 
   
  
 
 
b  Consumption habit  B (0.70, 0.10)  0.46 [0.36; 0.55]  0.56 [0.46; 0.66]  0.57 [0.47; 0.67]  0.51 [0.40; 0.62] 
??  Consumption utility  N (1.5, 0.375)  1.40 [1.15; 1.65]  1.54 [1.16; 1.92]  1.60 [1.04; 2.04]  1.66 [1.35; 1.95] 
??  Consumption labor  N (2.00, 0.75)  1.20 [0.60; 1.78]  1.69 [0.96; 2.40]  1.93 [1.10; 2.75]  1.64 [0.77; 2.50] 
??  Investment adj. cost  N (4.00, 1.50)  6.87 [4.99; 8.71]  8.40 [6.35; 10.50]  8.72 [6.67; 10.85]  8.25 [6.38; 10.12] 
??  Entry adj. cost  N (4.00, 1.50)  1.88 [1.38; 2.37]  2.66 [1.95; 3.35]  2.21 [1.40; 3.02]  1.47 [1.14; 1.80] 
? �?  Capacity util. cost  B (0.50, 0.15)  0.67 [0.52; 0.83]  0.74 [0.61; 0.88]  0.74 [0.60; 0.88]  0.89 [0.83; 0.96] 
??  Indexation prices  B (0.50, 0.15)  0.57 [0.36; 0.78]  0.59 [0.39; 0.79]  0.49 [0.28; 0.69]  0.89 [0.82; 0.96] 
??  Price rigidity  G (50.0, 7.50)  59.73 [47.5; 71.7]  63.70 [51.3; 76.0]  62.03 [49.8; 74.0]  70.38 [57.4; 83.3] 
??  Indexation wages  B (0.50, 0.15)  0.50 [0.31; 0.69]  0.55 [0.36; 0.74]  0.54 [0.35; 0.73]  0.64 [0.45; 0.82] 
??  Wage rigidity  G (50.0, 7.50)  59.15 [46.0; 71.7]  61.28 [47.9; 73.9]  63.63 [50.5; 76.7]  60.43 [47.9; 73.0] 
?  Demand elasticity  N (4.00, 1.50)  5.84 [4.70; 7.00]  8.38 [7.41; 9.32]  5.75 [4.39; 7.08]  9.60 [8.25; 10.92] 
?  Competition effect 
 
0.17 [0.14; 0.21]  0.12 [0.11; 0.13] 
 
0.10 [0.09; 0.12] 
??  Interest smoothing  B (0.75, 0.10)  0.77 [0.72; 0.82]  0.73 [0.68; 0.78]  0.73 [0.67; 0.78]  0.74 [0.69; 0.80] 
??  Policy inflation  G (1.50, 0.25)  2.13 [1.79; 2.46]  1.81 [1.53; 2.09]  1.75 [1.47; 2.02]  1.79 [1.47; 2.08] 
??  Policy output  G (0.50, 0.25)  0.11 [0.05; 0.16]  0.07 [0.03; 0.12]  0.06 [0.01; 0.10]  0.10 [0.03; 0.16] 
???  Policy lagged output  G (0.50, 0.25)  0.39 [0.31; 0.48]  0.38 [0.29; 0.47]  0.37 [0.29; 0.46]  0.51 [0.39; 0.63] 
           
 
AR(1), MA(1) 
       
 
??  TFP  B (0.50, 0.15)  0.98 [0.98; 0.99]  0.98 [0.98;0.99]  0.98 [0.98;0.99]  0.98 [0.97;0.99] 
??  Time Impatience  B (0.50, 0.15) 
 
0.29 [0.14; 0.43]  0.29 [0.15; 0.43]  0.32 [0.16; 0.48] 
???  Risk Premium  B (0.50, 0.15)  0.55 [0.40; 0.71] 
   
 
??  Inv. Spec. Tech.  B (0.50, 0.15)  0.49 [0.39; 0.59]  0.43 [0.34; 0.52]  0.39 [0.30; 0.48]  0.46 [0.36; 0.56] 
??  Gov. Spending  B (0.50, 0.15)  0.88 [0.86; 0.91]  0.89 [0.86; 0.92]  0.89 [0.86; 0.92]  0.88 [0.85; 0.91] 
??  Price Markup AR(1)  B (0.50, 0.15)  0.74 [0.65; 0.83]  0.73 [0.65; 0.82]  0.74 [0.66; 0.83]  0.51 [0.41; 0.62] 
??  Wage Markup AR(1)  B (0.50, 0.15)  0.98 [0.97; 0.99]  0.98 [0.96; 0.99]  0.95 [0.82; 0.99]  0.98 [0.97; 0.99] 
??  Monetary Policy  B (0.50, 0.15)  0.21 [0.11; 0.31]  0.24 [0.13; 0.34]  0.23 [0.13; 0.33]  0.24 [0.14; 0.35] 
??  Entry Cost  B (0.50, 0.15)  0.88 [0.86; 0.91]  0.85 [0.81; 0.89]  0.84 [0.80; 0.88]  0.83 [0.80; 0.86] 
???  Corr. TFP – Gov.  B (0.50, 0.15)  0.74 [0.59; 0.91]  0.77 [0.62; 0.92]  0.74 [0.58; 0.91]  0.78 [0.64; 0.92] 
??  Wage Markup MA(1)  B (0.50, 0.15)  0.72 [0.61; 0.84]  0.66 [0.53; 0.80]  0.60 [0.42; 0.78]  0.66 [0.53; 0.81] 
??  Price Markup MA(1)  B (0.50, 0.15)  0.49 [0.32; 0.64]  0.45 [0.29; 0.61]  0.47 [0.31; 0.63]  0.31 [0.16; 0.45] 
   
 
     
 
INNOVATIONS   
     
 
??  TFP  IG (0.10, 2)  0.81 [0.73; 0.89]  0.79 [0.72; 0.87]  0.83 [0.75; 0.91]  0.95 [0.85; 1.05] 
??  Time Impatience  IG (0.10, 2) 
 
0.24 [0.19; 0.28]  0.24 [0.19; 0.28]  0.25 [0.19; 0.30] 
???  Risk Premium  IG (0.10, 2)  0.71 [0.45; 0.96] 
   
 
??  Inv. Spec. Tech.  IG (0.10, 2)  1.24 [0.99; 1.48]  1.22 [1.01; 1.41]  1.44 [1.16; 1.71]  1.10 [0.91; 1.29] 
??  Gov. Spending  IG (0.10, 2)  3.17 [2.82; 3.51]  2.95 [2.67; 3.24]  3.19 [2.83; 3.54]  2.86 [2.58; 3.13] 
??  Price Markup  IG (0.10, 2)  0.30 [0.24; 0.37]  0.33 [0.26; 0.39]  0.28 [0.22; 0.34]  0.53 [0.46; 0.61] 
??  Wage Markup  IG (0.10, 2)  0.38 [0.31; 0.46]  0.39 [0.32; 0.46]  0.39 [0.31; 0.46]  0.40 [0.32; 0.47] 
??  Monetary Policy  IG (0.10, 2)  0.27 [0.24; 0.30]  0.26 [0.23; 0.29]  0.26 [0.23; 0.30]  0.27 [0.23; 0.31] 
??  Entry Cost  IG (0.10, 2)  2.43 [2.02; 2.85]  3.27 [2.71; 3.81]  2.94 [2.41; 3.45]  2.90 [2.51; 3.29] 
??  Profit Meas. Error  IG (0.10, 2)    12.45 [11.3; 13.6]     
             
 
Note:  ‘Risk-P’  replaces the time-impatience shock  by the Smets and Wouters  (2007)  risk-premium shock  which 
generates comovement between consumption and investment. ‘P’ uses profit data in the estimation and introduces a 
measurement error in equation (8). ‘CES’ is a model with constant elasticity of substitution between goods as in Dixit 
and Stiglitz (1977). ‘Asym-PF’ is a model with an asymmetric production structure for the entry and goods producing 
sector. B = Beta, G = Gamma, IG = Inverse Gamma and N = Normal distributions. P1 = Mean and P2 = Standard 
deviation for all distributions. Posterior moments are computed using 960,000 draws from the distribution simulated 
by the Random Walk Metropolis Hastings algorithm. Table 3 (Contd): Sensitivity Analysis 
 
   
PRIOR  POSTERIOR DISTRIBUTION: Mean [5
th; 95
th %ile
 ] 
Symbol  Description  (P1,P2)  NE  NI  Births 
       
  
  STRUCTURAL PARAMETERS 
   
  
  b  Consumption habit  B (0.70, 0.10)  0.58 [0.48; 0.68]  0.59 [0.48; 0.70]  0.56 [0.44; 0.68] 
??  Consumption utility  N (1.5, 0.375)  1.42 [1.02; 1.80]  1.31 [0.98; 1.64]  1.55 [1.13; 1.97] 
??  Consumption labor  N (2.00, 0.75)  1.42 [0.70; 2.10]  1.40 [0.70; 2.11]  2.46 [1.44; 3.49] 
??  Investment adj. cost  N (4.00, 1.50)  8.62 [6.60; 10.57]  8.60 [5.61; 9.58]  5.15 [3.06; 7.23] 
??  Entry adj. cost  N (4.00, 1.50)  1.88 [1.33; 2.40]  0.85 [0.65; 1.04]  0.56 [0.42; 0.69] 
? �?  Capacity util. cost  B (0.50, 0.15)  0.74 [0.61; 0.88]  0.70 [0.56; 0.85]  0.81 [0.69; 0.94] 
??  Indexation prices  B (0.50, 0.15)  0.49 [0.28; 0.69]  0.41 [0.23; 0.60]  0.45 [0.22; 0.68] 
??  Price rigidity  G (50.0, 7.50)  60.78 [48.5; 72.7]  62.13 [49.9; 74.1]  64.87 [52.0; 78.2] 
??  Indexation wages  B (0.50, 0.15)  0.52 [0.33; 0.71]  0.53 [0.34; 0.72]  0.45 [0.21; 0.69] 
??  Wage rigidity  G (50.0, 7.50)  61.59 [48.4; 74.2]  61.85 [49.1; 75.1]  53.68 [41.0; 65.8] 
?  Demand elasticity  N (4.00, 1.50)  5.38 [4.30; 6.46]  5.33 [4.50; 6.16]  4.98 [3.92; 6.04] 
?  Competition effect 
 
0.19 [0.15; 0.23]  0.19 [0.16; 0.22]  0.20 [0.16; 0.25] 
??  Interest smoothing  B (0.75, 0.10)  0.71 [0.65; 0.77]  0.71 [0.65; 0.77]  0.87 [0.83; 0.90] 
??  Policy inflation  G (1.50, 0.25)  1.74 [1.47; 2.00]  1.74 [1.48; 1.99]  1.88 [1.46; 2.29] 
??  Policy output  G (0.50, 0.25)  0.06 [0.02; 0.09]  0.04 [0.01; 0.07]  0.17 [0.06; 0.27] 
???  Policy lagged output  G (0.50, 0.25)  0.36 [0.28; 0.45]  0.33 [0.25; 0.41]  0.17 [0.10; 0.24] 
            AR(1), MA(1) 
        ??  TFP  B (0.50, 0.15)  0.98 [0.98; 0.99]  0.98 [0.98;0.99]  0.64 [0.51;0.77] 
??  Time Impatience  B (0.50, 0.15)  0.29 [0.15; 0.43]  0.32 [0.16; 0.48]  0.76 [0.66; 0.86] 
???  Risk Premium  B (0.50, 0.15) 
      ??  Inv. Spec. Tech.  B (0.50, 0.15)  0.40 [0.30; 0.50]  0.51 [0.41; 0.61]  0.46 [0.33; 0.60] 
??  Gov. Spending  B (0.50, 0.15)  0.89 [0.86; 0.91]  0.88 [0.85; 0.91]  0.83 [0.75; 0.91] 
??  Price Markup AR(1)  B (0.50, 0.15)  0.75 [0.66; 0.84]  0.74 [0.65; 0.84]  0.72 [0.60; 0.85] 
??  Wage Markup AR(1)  B (0.50, 0.15)  0.96 [0.89; 0.99]  0.93 [0.86; 0.99]  0.53 [0.34; 0.72] 
??  Monetary Policy  B (0.50, 0.15)  0.23 [0.13; 0.33]  0.24 [0.14; 0.34]  0.32 [0.17; 0.47] 
??  Entry Cost  B (0.50, 0.15)  0.85 [0.82; 0.89]  0.83 [0.79; 0.87]  0.52 [0.38; 0.65] 
???  Corr. TFP – Gov.  B (0.50, 0.15)  0.74 [0.58; 0.91]  0.73 [0.56; 0.90]  0.58 [0.35; 0.82] 
??  Wage Markup MA(1)  B (0.50, 0.15)  0.64 [0.49; 0.79]  0.58 [0.41; 0.76]  0.46 [0.27; 0.65] 
??  Price Markup MA(1)  B (0.50, 0.15)  0.49 [0.33; 0.66]  0.50 [0.33; 0.67]  0.46 [0.27; 0.66] 
   
 
      INNOVATIONS   
      ??  TFP  IG (0.10, 2)  0.83 [0.75; 0.92]  0.85 [0.76; 0.93]  0.61 [0.51; 0.70] 
??  Time Impatience  IG (0.10, 2)  0.34 [0.19; 0.28]  0.23 [0.18; 0.28]  0.07 [0.04; 0.10] 
???  Risk Premium  IG (0.10, 2) 
      ??  Inv. Spec. Tech.  IG (0.10, 2)  1.42 [1.15; 1.67]  1.15 [0.95; 1.36]  1.16 [0.86; 1.44] 
??  Gov. Spending  IG (0.10, 2)  3.24 [2.88; 3.59]  3.25 [2.91; 3.59]  2.33 [1.94; 2.69] 
??  Price Markup  IG (0.10, 2)  0.28 [0.22; 0.34]  0.27 [0.21; 0.32]  0.18 [0.13; 0.23] 
??  Wage Markup  IG (0.10, 2)  0.38 [0.31; 0.45]  0.38 [0.31; 0.45]  0.81 [0.64; 0.97] 
??  Monetary Policy  IG (0.10, 2)  0.27 [0.23; 0.30]  0.27 [0.24; 0.31]  0.20 [0.08; 0.12] 
??  Entry Cost  IG (0.10, 2)  2.85 [2.39; 3.29]  3.13 [2.68; 3.57]  3.16 [2.50; 3.78] 
??  Profit Meas. Error  IG (0.10, 2)       
           
 
Note: ‘NE’ matches the series of net business formation with net entry in the model. ‘NI’ denotes the use of data on 
New Incorporations instead of data on net business formation. ‘Births’ estimates the model on a later sample using 
establishment data. B = Beta, G = Gamma, IG = Inverse Gamma and N = Normal distributions. P1 = Mean and P2 = 
Standard deviation for all distributions. Posterior moments are computed using 480,000 draws from the distribution 
simulated by the Random Walk Metropolis Hastings algorithm. 
 Figure 1a: Impulse Responses to Supply Shocks
Note: Impulse responses functions (IRFs) to a one standard deviation shock, measured in percentage deviations from steady state. Median
IRF and 5th and 95th percentiles are based on 300 random draws from the posterior distribution. All shocks have been normalized to produce
an increase in GDP.Figure 1b: Impulse Response to Demand Shocks
Note: Impulse responses functions (IRFs) to a one standard deviation shock, measured in percentage deviations from steady state. Median
IRF and 5th and 95th percentiles are based on 300 random draws from the posterior distribution. All shocks have been normalized to produce
an increase in GDP.Figure 1c: Impulse Responses to Monetary Policy and Price Markup Shocks
Note: Impulse responses functions (IRFs) to a one standard deviation shock, measured in percentage deviations from steady state. Median
IRF and 5th and 95th percentiles are based on 300 random draws from the posterior distribution. All shocks have been normalized to produce
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Figure 2: The Cyclicality of the Markup
Note: The ￿gure shows the cyclicality of the model-implied markup at di⁄erent leads and lags. The left panel depicts the actual markup ^
￿ t as implied
by the model, the center panel shows the counterfactual markup in the absence of the competition e⁄ect ^
￿
n
￿
￿ E
t , and the right panel depicts the
counterfactual ￿sticky price￿ markup ^
￿
S
P
t , which we would obtain in the absence of both the competition e⁄ect and desired markup shocks. 
 
 
Figure 3: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (at posterior mode) 
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Figure 4a: Counterfactual Decomposition of US Inflation: Earlier Sample 
Note: Entry is measured as net business formation. The inflation rate and its components have been constructed by feeding the smoothed shocks into the 
model. The ‘Exogenous component’ represents the contribution of desired price markup shocks to inflation. The ‘Sticky Price Component’ captures the 
counterfactual inflation path when desired markups are constant. The ‘Competition Effect Component’ is the residual of the actual inflation rate less the 
two other components. 
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Figure 4b: Counterfactual Decomposition of US Inflation: Later Sample 
Note: Entry is measured as establishment births. The inflation rate and its components have been constructed by feeding the smoothed shocks into the 
model. The ‘Exogenous component’ represents the contribution of desired price markup shocks to inflation. The ‘Sticky Price Component’ captures the 
counterfactual inflation path when desired markups are constant. The ‘Competition Effect Component’ is the residual of the actual inflation rate less the 
two other components. 
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Actual Inflation 
Exogenous component 
Sticky Price Component 
Competition Effect Component Figure 5: Sensitivity Analysis. Impulse Responses to Risk Premium Shock
Note: Impulse responses functions (IRFs) to a one standard deviation shock, measured in percentage deviations from steady state. Median
IRF and 5th and 95th percentiles are based on 300 random draws from the posterior distribution. All shocks have been normalized to produce
an increase in GDP.